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examination of the record indicated that justice so required. That's all the statute said,
it empowered an appellate court to go beyond mere legal error and to actually weigh
the evidence that the jury heard that had been presented on the record. The court would
then simply decide whether or not that verdict was consonant with justice. If the court
determined that it was not, it could lower the verdict.
And I say that, there is a component in 33E review that relates to proportionality
because if you read the decisions in which the court has exercised that power, and the
arguments that are often made in this context, what the court does is it actually
compares the case before it with others where a verdict was reduced. The SJC does this
now, even though we don't have a death penalty. The court essentially asks whether
this first-degree murder conviction is in the same ballpark as others. Or, is this case off
the mark? The SJC will exercise that reduction power. They do it sparingly, and
probably in sixty-five years they've only done it thirty or so times.
So the other aspect of 33E is one that Professor Hoffmann mentioned. That is,
regardless of any procedural defaults, errors can be reviewed to see whether or not a
miscarriage of justice occurred. Even perhaps more remarkable, the court can raise
errors or claims and review things sua sponte, things that no one had raised. This is
exactly the kind of substantive review that I think was important to the Council's
recommendations. Fortunately, it's a mechanism already in place. It's similar to what
Professor Hoffmann referred to as the fundamental justice amendment. I think that this
type of review coupled with the other layers of review is one of the things that make
the Council's Report a modem blueprint for what could hopefully be a model death
penalty in Massachusetts and in other jurisdictions.
I wanted to mention one thing based on what Professor Hoffmann had said that I
thought was interesting. I thought about this when you questioned whether or not jurors
would become aware of substantive review and whether it would have an effect on
their decision. I don't know whether that would actually happen. It hasn't happened to
my knowledge in Massachusetts. We've had 33E review for about 65 years, and that
issue hasn't come up. That is, to my knowledge, that jurors would feel that their role is
diminished in any way by the substantive appellate review that is done by the SJC.
Thank you.
PROCEDURAL DEFAULT IN CAPrrAL CASES
Thomas F. Schornhorst
Before I begin my remarks, which focus on these recommendations, let me echo
something that Dean Lefstein mentioned yesterday, and it was picked up somewhat in
Professor Zimring's eloquent address to us. Even though this document might not
become a basis of model legislation, or have a snowball's chance in hell of being
passed in Massachusetts or anyone else, it does remind us, in states that have the death
penalty, of severe shortcomings in our processes. And it reminds those states in the
Midwest-Iowa, Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin-who might want to think about
adopting the death penalty that there are some serious problems and some things they
really have to think over. That is going to be one of the key contributions, not only of
the Report, but of this conference which has contained some marvelous comments and
ideas.
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I think it was during Professor Zimring's presentation that he waved a document at
us which was a thick report, produced by the Criminal Law Study Commission here in
Indiana, on a charge from the late Governor Frank O'Bannon, after the Illinois
experience, to see whether there is a danger of executing innocent persons in Indiana. It
was a very narrow charge. And the commission that studied this issue came up with the
conclusion, basically, that everything is peachy keen in Indiana. We haven't executed
anybody who was innocent, and given the multiple levels of review that are available,
the wonderful provision of counsel, even through the postconviction process, there
really isn't any danger of that either.
They did come up, however, with two recommendations. One, let's raise the age of
execution eligibility to eighteen, and, two, let's make the jury responsible for imposing
the death penalty, which is now constitutionally required anyway. They also found one
interesting fact: extensive statistical analysis concluded that the death penalty process
exceeds the cost of life without parole by 13-17%. But they decided not to make any
recommendations based upon that finding.
Now there were some minority members on that Commission that wanted to discuss
the kinds of recommendations that we've been looking at here. But the Chairman, in
essence, said, "Those are out of order. We're not going to discuss those." They said,
"We'd like to file a minority report, where we can detail these kinds ofconcerns." And
he said, "No, you can't file a minority report." So, in essence, that big document was
nothing but a whitewash, and I think we haven't had any meaningful study of this
problem in Indiana. And God knows there are problems. I see them all the time in
situations with which I am involved, and I talk to others about them.
I'm going to limit my comments to recommendation number nine and the first
paragraph, which really doesn't deal with the post-trial process, but which deals with
pretrial screening. It provides that the trial judge should-I'd rather that be "must"--
the trial judge should examine carefully the aggravating circumstances that were
identified by the prosecution as the basis for the capital murder prosecution. In other
words, a pretrial screening of aggravating circumstances, as opposed to pretrial
screening of the basis for a murder charge, which takes place in evidentiary preliminary
hearings or grand jury proceedings.
I did some research on this some years ago, because I had a case involving this very
question out of Indiana. To take the other extreme, in Indiana, there is virtually no
screening whatsoever of the prosecutor's decision to charge murder as opposed to the
death penalty. I mean, no screening whatsoever on death penalty aggravators. The only
screening that is available for any felony charge in Indiana, including murder, is an ex
parte judicial determination of probable cause, premised upon an affidavit submitted in
support of an arrest warrant. So a person could be arrested for shoplifting and the
prosecutor could say, "Well, gee, you know, this guy also was involved in a murder
down the street. So let's charge him with that, and then the death sentence follows
along." There is no review of that whatsoever.
Now, I'll give you an example from a case I handled some years ago. This involved
the killing of a white police officer by two African-American males. The police officer
was forcibly entering their home to serve an arrest warrant-by the way, the police
officer was illegally entering that home, because he had not properly announced his
purpose and his authority-and he was shot and killed in the process. That happened in
the predawn hours of a December morning. By the time the 6:00 o'clock news was
aired that night, the prosecutor announced his decision to seek the death penalty for
these two individuals, without any investigation as to what really happened. Of course,
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after that, the investigation was skewed entirely toward establishing the prosecution's
theory. We raised that issue on appeal through the federal courts, but were shot down
all the way. That is why I think this is such an important provision.
Now, it doesn't say anything about the form this inquiry should take. That could be
achieved in a variety of ways. My preference would be for an adversarial preliminary
hearing, where defense counsel can get in there and really test whether these
aggravating circumstances are met.
Again, there is a similarity between the provisions in the Council's Report and the
circumstances of the Indiana case I mentioned. One of the aggravating circumstances
in that case was the murder of a police officer. In this instance, the question was
whether the persons knew this was a police officer they were shooting at the time. And
that was an important issue that came out in the trial, although inadequately addressed.
That would have been a very apt subject for preliminary inquiries or evidence to
support the knowledge that who they were shooting at was this police officer. Under
the Massachusetts recommendations, that inquiry is more intense-you have to say not
only whether he knew he was a police officer, but was this for the very purpose of
obstructing an investigation? So that could be a very important feature of a preliminary
exam.
It could also take the form of a prosecutor's offer of proof supported by affidavits,
for example, or simply an oral offer, whether it be ex parte or whether that would be
available to the prosecution. But nonetheless, I think this is an important check on the
prosecutor's discretion, which is already limited in the Report. So it's a double
protection. But there are states out there that have no protection whatsoever, so I think
this is a very important consideration.
The second thing I want to remark on, in terms of my agreement with the Report, is
the provision that appellate counsel be someone other than a lawyer who has been
involved in the trial process. It is typical for the lawyer who does the trial to take the
appeal, and that's understandable because you are familiar with the record. But there
are occasions, probably in most cases, where lawyers, no matter how good they are,
screw up at some point during the course of the trial. And it's very hard to go to the
appellate court and say, "I'm sorry, I screwed up. Help me get out of this mess." Or,
the alternative, and the temptation, is to bury it; not mention it, and hope it will go
away. Hope that you get reversed on other grounds, and therefore your screw-up will
not be publicly aired. So, the provision of appellate counsel who was not trial counsel
is very good.
The last thing I want to talk about is the procedural default issue. Just going back a
moment, this is such a well-crafted process that if it's followed all the way through, and
everybody does their job, the appellate lawyers in Massachusetts doing death penalty
appeals are going to feel like the Maytag repairman; they are not going to have
anything to do. But we all know, no matter how carefully the process is laid out,
judges, lawyers, and prosecutors screw up. And the more procedural steps that you
have in a process, the more chances of screw-up. So as an appellate lawyer, I look at
this and I say, "Hooray." Now, in addition to the kinds of trial appeals I normally
would have, I have all of these procedures that I can examine, and perhaps attack, as
not being adequately provided in this particular trial. So it could expand the grounds
for appeal.
I have a couple of points on procedural default. That is one of the biggest problems
we face in the appellate and postconviction process. You look at a record, and as
you're reading through you say, "Holy cow, here is a dead-bang Doyle violation." That
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is, the prosecution mentioned the fact that my client's codefendant made a statement
that incriminated him, and that codefendant has not testified. The defense counsel had
no chance to crossexamine that witness. It is hearsay and denial of confrontation. Or,
this prosecutor made an inflammatory and improper argument to the jury, depriving the
defendant of a fair trial. But no objection; no motion to strike.
And so, when you try to raise that on appeal, what you get from the other side and
from the courts is, "Well, that may be bad, that may be terrible, but you didn't raise the
objection in the appropriate way. Therefore, it's procedurally defaulted, and you can't
argue that unless you can meet some other very narrow exceptions." That carries on
into the federal process as well. So you've got a constitutional violation that wasn't
properly preserved by the lawyer, but you can't argue it because of procedural default.
Now, I notice that in the Report you make a distinction between trial errors, i.e.,
those kinds of errors that may occur during the trial process, and those that are
originally made in the sentencing process. Procedural default doesn't apply in the
sentencing stage, but does still apply in the trial stage. But, given my defense
orientation, I'd rather procedural default be done away with entirely, and you can
revert to the old federal rule of "deliberate bypass." Seems to me that is a workable
rule at the state level.
But there are carryovers. Let me illustrate this by the closing argument example that
I suggested. Again, in this case of the police killing in Indianapolis, during the closing
argument in the guilt phase, the prosecutor violated every rule with respect to a proper
closing argument, including making overt racial references to the defendants. Here is
the prosecutor using racial references-in effect, telling the jury, "I'm letting my racial
biases creep into this process; it's okay if you let yours creep into this process." There
was no objection, of course, either after the argument or during the argument, and the
issue was procedurally defaulted through the whole process.
Now, under the Massachusetts rule, that might be procedurally defaulted as a basis
for reversing the conviction. But I think there is a carryover in cases like that where
you get into the sentencing process. This very well might be the straw that tips the scale
in favor of the death sentence for some improper, almost substantive reason. That's the
kind of fairness aspect I think you are talking about here; something that is basically
procedural, but affects the substance of the decision that is being made. So this
carryover, I think, will apply here in cases like that.
That is a very good provision; I wish we had that in Indiana at the time of my case.
And that will apply without regard to whether it's actually raised in the sentencing
process before the judge, because it could also be raised on appeal. Then it would be
preserved for federal habeas corpus. The federal habeas corpus court could come in, as
they did in my case, and say, "Well, you procedurally defaulted, but because the merits
were allowed to be argued in the state court, we can consider it."
So I commend the Council for attacking this issue of procedural default. I wish you
had gone further, but it is definitely a step in the right direction.
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